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"THE COURT: It begs the question which is this: DOt.'8 
your established rule of conduct not operate by way of an 
admission as to what is necessary in the way of safe street 
maintenance, and when you say it is not and therefore it 
does not prove anything, you come around in a circle. Does 
not the city's adoption and pursuit of that standard of conduct 
operate by way of admission as to what is reasonably necessary 
and proper to the end of safety I 
"(Further discussion omitted.) 
"TBB COURT: If I understand tou correctly, it is now 
stipulated that aside from the testimony of Mr. Kincaid and 
Mr. Fell, the plaintiff has no further evidence to oJfer in 
chief, and it is stipulated that the defendant may and will go 
forward forthwith with the proof of its ease and without 
prejudice to the making of any motion for non-suit if so 
advised when the plaintiff shall have finally rested' Is that 
correct I 
"MR. O'CONNOR: Yes. 
"Ma. HAYES:- Yes.-
II (.rury resumes their plaee in the jury box.)" 
At the close of plaintiff's case, the following appears in th(' 
record: 
"Ma .. O'CoNNOR: That is all. 
"With the stipulation plaintiff will rest, with the stipula-
tion that we have. 
"TBB COURT: Do you want that read nowl 
"Ma. O'CONNOR: I would appreciate it, your Honor. 
"TBB COURT: Counsel for defendant adequately stnft'd 
into the record such objections as you had to the stipulated 
facts I 
"Ma. HAn:s: Well, I had better restate my position at 
this time. First, that the contents <d the proposed stipulat.ion 
with reference to the repairs of the damages as to sidewalks, 
are merely instructions to workmen, giving them some idea as 
to what types of holes, what to look for to indicate if side-
walks are beginning to deteriorate. They are not a set of rules 
or standards. Second, that the superintendent of streets has 
no authority to adopt a set of rules which would give, as a 
standard for any imposition or determination of the liability 
of the City, what holes mayor may not be dangerous or 
defective. Third, that the City of Long Beach has the right 
-Defendant contrasts the plain showing iD the record ot ita assent 
·to this stipuL'ltion with the absence ot all)" evidence of ita aasoat to 
the .tipulatiOll dictated iDto the rveord b1 the trial court. 
) 
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to give instructions to its men to take preventive measures 
for the repair of its sidewalks which may be, or at a later 
date become, defective without determining that the hole eon-
stitutes dangerous or defective conditions or that there is 
anything about the hole at the time that the repair is made 
that it is a dangerous or defective condition. 
e e May I mix argument with objections' On the further 
ground it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and does 
not tend to prove any of the issues in this case. It doesn't 
tend to prove this particular spot or any other particular 
spot in the City of Long Beach was in a dangerous or defective 
condition, ealls for a conclusion on the part of Mr. Kincaid 
or the parties who make the repairs. That states my position 
as well as the objections. 
"To Col1B'r: The objection is overruled. 
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, from time to time 
throughout the case you have heard counsel stipulate that cer-
tain things might be done or certain things were true. While 
statements of counsel ordinarily are to be taken merely as argu-
ment or objection and not evidence, when they stipulate to a 
fact or facts, that establishes those facts for the purposes 
bf the case. Last night in your absence counsel for the respec-
tive parties did make a stipulation concerning certain facts, 
which stipulation will now be read to you by the reporter." 
At this point the court reporter read the stipulation to the 
jury. 
Defend~t '. objection to the stipulation dictated into the 
record by the trial court is directed at the statement therein 
that "the City had a<\opted and did pursue, as a standard 
of conduct with respect to the maintenance and repair of its 
streets the following rule. • • ." Defendant concedes that 
counsel for the city was willing to stipulate that Mr. Kincaid, 
the superintendent of streets, if c81led as a witness for plain-
tift would testify that he had given certain instructions to 
his workmen with reference to the maintenance and repair 
of the streets, but contends that counsel for defendant was 
unwilling to concede, and did not assent to the trial court's 
assumption that these instructions constituted a "standard 
of conduct" adopted and pursued by the city. 
[3] Unless the trial court, in its discretion, permits a party 
to withdraw from a stipulation {see 23 Cal.Jur. § 14, p. 829; 
161 A.L.R. 1161, note; 60 C.J., § 98, p. 91; 9 Wigmore on 
Evidence (3d ed.), § 2G90, p. 588), it is conclusive upon the 
parties, and the truth of the facts contained therein cannot 
) 
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ht' eontradicted. (Woodward v.Bro'UJ'n, 119 Cal. 283, 295 [51 
P. 2, 542, 63 Am.St.Rep. 108] ; Haese v. Heitzeg, 15!? Cal. 569. 
575 [114 P. 816] ; see 23Cal.Jur., § 12, p. 826; 2 Jones, Com-
mentaries on Evidence, § 257, p. 454.) Hence, if the parties 
assented to the stipulation in question, defendant cannot now 
contend that a "standard of conduct" was not adopted by 
the city with respect to the maintenance and repair of its 
streets . 
. [4] A stipulation is an agreement between cou,nsel respect-
ing business before the court (Bouv. Law Diet., Baldwin's 
Century Edition), and like any other agreement or contract, 
it is essential that the parties or their counsel agree to its 
terms. (See, Back v. Farmworth, 25 Cal.App.2d 212, 219-220 
[77 P.2d 295]; 23 Cal.Jur. § 9, p. 822; Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 
1565; 60 C.J. § 3, p. 40.) As provided in section 283 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure: "An attorney and counselor shall 
have authority: 1. To bind his client in any of the steps 
of an action or proceeding by his agreement filed with the 
clerk, or entered upon the minutes of the court, and not 
otherwise; . . ." [5] While it is true that in the instant 
case, the purported stipulation was entered in the minutes 
immediately after consultation between court and counsel (see, 
Borkkeim v. North British If M. Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 623, 628), 
there is no evidence that defendant ever agreed to the stipula-
tion as worded either at the time the consultation took place 
or at the time the stipulation was dictated into the record. 
Had defendant's counsel remained silent after dictation of 
this stipulation, his passive acquiescence would constitute 
assent. (Low Estate Co; v. Lederer Realty Co., 39 R.I. 422, 
429 [98 A. 180]. See also,Ward v. Goetz, 33 Cal.App. 595, 
597 [165 P. 1022]; Wilson v. Mattei, 84 Cal.App: 567, 571 
[258 P. 453].) He did not remain silent, however, but 
immediately following the court's dictation, objected to the 
admissibility of the stipulation and argued that no "standard 
of conduct" had been adopted by the city, and that what. 
the court termed a "standard of conduct" merely consisted 
of instructions given to workmen by the Superintendent of 
Streets. The argument between the court and defendant's 
coun.<rel shows clearly that the court was dictating into the 
record over the protestations of defendant's counsel, the 
court's own version of the facts and the court's own conclu-
sion that the superintendent's instructions to workmen con-
stituted a "standard of conduct" adopted by the city. 
) 
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In the absence of evidence that defendant consented to the 
stipulaiion, it can hardly be maintained that there was an 
"agreement ... entered upon the minutes of the court" as 
contemplated by the foregoing section of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Entry of the purported st.ipulation in the minutes 
upon request of plaintiff's counsel did not bind defendant 
!lince "it was not in the power of the Court, nor anyone eIRe, 
without [defendant's] consent, or that of [its] attorney. to 
make it binding." (Bork1t.Bim v. North British ct M. 1m. Co., 
supra, 38 Cal. 623, 628.) 
[6] It is contended, however, that since the record is 
silent as to what occurred between the court and counsel at the 
bench before the court dictated the stipulation, it must be 
assumed that the parties agreed to it at that time and that 
defendant was thereafter simply objecting to its admissi.bility 
in evidence. The only recital in the record from which it could 
be assumed that defendant assented to the stipulation is the 
court's statement to the jury that "Last ni~ht in your absence 
counsel for the respective parties did make a stipUlation 
which stipulation will now be read to you by the reporter." 
This statement, implying as it does that defendant assented 
,to the stipulation as worded, is not supported by the record 
and is therefore not conclusive on this issue. (See, Sheppard 
v. Sheppard, 15 Cal.App. 614, 618-619 [115 P. 7G1].) Counsel 
for defendant objected not only to the evidentiary use of the 
stipulation but also interposed a specific objection "that the 
contents of the proposed stipulation with reference to the 
repairs of the damages as to sidewalks, are merely instruc-
tions to workmen, giving them some idea as to what type of 
holes, what to look for to indicate if sidewalks are bcginning 
to deteriorate. They: .arellot a set of rules or standards." In 
the light of this objection and the I argnment between the 
court an!! defendant's counsel regarding the terms and effect 
of the purported stipulation, it is not rCllSonable to as.<mme 
that counsel for defendant had previously agreed to the 
stipulation and was thereafter simply objecting to its admissi-
bility in evidence. [7] Unless it is clear from the record 
that both parties assented, there is no stipulation. (Borkheim 
v. North British &7 M. Ins. Co., supra, 38 Cal. 623.) This rule 
is particularly pertinent when, as here, the purported stipllln-
, tion gave up the basic defense upon which defendant relied, 
',namely, that it violated no rea.<lOnable standard of conduct 
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City High School Did. v. DiU07&, 34 Cal.,App.2d 636, 647 [94 
P.2d 86].) ,\ 
In view of an attorney's duti to his client it should not \ 
lightly be assumed that he stipulated away his case. Certainly, 
defendant's willingness to stipulate that Mr. Kincaid would ' 
give certain testimony if called as a witness does not justify 
committing defendant to the trial court's views of the legal 
significance of that testimony in the absence of evidence that 
defendant agreed thereto. [8] StipUlations must be given 
a' reasonable construction with a view to giving effect to the 
intent of the parties and "the language used will not be so 
construed as to give it the effect of an admission of a fact 
ob,,·j.>usly ffitended to be controverted, or the waiver of a right 
not plainly intended to be relinquished, ... " (HuegeZ v. 
Huegel, 329 Mo. 571, 576 [46 S.W.2d 157], quoting from 36 
Cyc. 1291, 1292. See also, Seale v. Ford, 29 Cal. 104, 108; 
City of San JOS6 v. Uridias, 37 Cal. 339, 345-346; OfT v. 
Forde, 101 Cal.,App. 694, 699 [282 P. 429] ; Back v. Darns-
worth, 25 Cal.App.2d 212, 220 [77 P.2d 295]; 23 Cal.Jur., 
§ 11, p. 824; 50 Am.Jur. 609.) .As stated by the court in 
Theatrical Enterprise8, Inc. v. De,.r07&, 119 Cal.App. 671, 
676 [7 P.2d 351] : "It may be conceded that stipulations of 
fact, where no real controversy of fact appears, should be 
encouraged, and when entered into, should be strictly enforced. 
But there should be no sacrifice of substantial rights merely 
to subserve the constant importuning to speed up trials. The 
purpose of every trial is to examine into disputed facts. . • • 
Stipulations are ordinarily entered into for the purpose of 
avoiding delay, trouble or expense . .As a general rule they 
should receive a fair and liberal construction, in harmony 
with the apparent intention of the parties and the spirit 
of justice, and in furtherance of fair trials upon the, merits, 
rather than a narrow and technical one, calculated to defeat 
the purposes of their execution. (25 R.C.L. 1095.)" 
[9] Since there is no evidence that defendant ever agreed 
to the stipUlation, the trial court erred in admitting it in 
evidence and in causing it to be read to the jury over the 
objections of defendant's counsel. 
'fhis error was prejudicial to the rights of defendant and 
necessitates reversing the judgment. The stipulation dictated 
by the trial court related not simply to the facts but to the 
legal significance of certain facta and bore directly on the 
ba.'!ic issue whether the defect in question was dangerous and 
whether the city in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
Nov. 1948] PALMER 'I). CITY OF LONG BEACH 
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known about it and repaired it. It was for the jury to 
formulate the standard by which to determine whether the 
defect in question was dangerous within the meaning of the 
Public Liability Act. (Balkwill v. City of Stockton, supra, 50 
Cal.App.2d 661, 667.) The phrase "that the City had adopted 
and did pursue, as a standard of conduct" carried the clear 
connotation that the city's own standard of a dangerous 
defect was a defect of a depth of one-half inch or more and 
that the city regarded the repair of such defects as reason-
ably necessary for the safe maintenance of its sidewalks. 
That the trial judge himself so understood the stipulation, is 
clear from his argument with counsel, for it was because of 
this very understanding that he ruled that the stipulation was 
admissible. Since the city did uot enter into the stipulation 
as worded, it was prejudicial error for the trial court to 
dictate it into the record as evidence in the case, for the jury 
was then free to adopt as their own standard of a dangerous 
defect the very standard that the city purportedly adopted. 
The evidence established without conflict that the hole 
exceeded one-half inch in depth. Therefore, if defendant 
entered into the stipulation, it thereby admitted its own neg-
ligence in failing to repair the hole. As stated by the trial 
eourt, the adoption and pursuit of the" standard of conduct" 
recited in the stipulation was an "admission on the part of 
the defendant as to what was reasonably necessary for the safe 
maintenance of the street." Since the other elements of plain-
tiff's cause of action were clearly proved, upon proof of 
defendant's negligence by its own admission, its liability 
under the Public Liability Act would necessarily follow. 
The effect of the stipulation was; therefore, to remove from 
dispute the very issues upon which the city's liability depended, 
namely, whether the defect causing plaintiff's fall was dan-
gerous within the meaning of the Public Liability Act, and 
whether the city, in the exercise of reasonable care, was under 
a duty to repair it. Its admission in evidence over the objec-
tions of counsel for defendant prevented a fair trial on the 
merits. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
eoncurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority of this court l'eVf'r!les a judgment for plain-
tiff for personal injuries Hulrcrcu as the result of a dangerous 
) 
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and defective condition of defendant city's street solely upon 
the ground that a stipulation was improperly admitted in 
eyidence, or perhaps more accurately stated, that a purported 
stipulation was not such because it was not agreed to by de-
fendant. The basic fallacy in that holding is that the record 
shows that defendant did agree to (or it must be assumed it 
did) the facts contained in the stipulation, and its only 
objection or lack of assent was to the admiss,oility in evidence 
of those facts; or in other words that the facts stated in the 
stipulation were not admissible in evidence. 
It will be noted from the majority opinion that the stipu-
lation had to do with matters within the knowledge of James 
Kincaid, the city superintendent of streets, namely, the in-
structions, rules or practice of the city with regard to the 
repair of all defects in the streets of over one-half inch in 
depth. The first place in the record that Kincaid comes into 
the picture is near the close of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff's 
counsel stated that he would like to "call" Kincaid to the wit-
ness stand. To the court's inquiry of whether he was present 
there was no response. In view of that state of affairs plain-
tiff's counsel stated that he wanted "to call a man [clearly 
referring to Kincaid] whose duty it was to inspect any repair-
ing of the sidewalk." To the court's query of whether he had 
another witness he could "put on" at that time (that is, that 
such was necessary for Kincaid was not present), plaintiff 
answered in the affirmative and called another witness to the 
stand. After that witness testified the record is silent aff to 
what occurred. It merely appears that counsel was called 
to the bench out of the hearing of the jury and the courtwith-, 
out ado recited the stipulation. 'Clearly there must have been 
a preliminary discussion between coUllBel and the court, and 
in the absence of the nature thereof we must assume that it 
followed the usual and ordinary course, that is, that there was 
no necessity of calling Kincaid as a witness for there was no 
dispute as to what his testimony would be with reference to 
the practice or rule of the city in regard to repairing its streets ; 
the only question would be the admissibility of his testimony. 
Not only should wc make that assumption but it is borne out 
by the previou~ unavailing calling of Kincaid, defendant's 
fa:lure to cn.Il Kincp.id to testify differently, and the jury in-
struction ofierco by defendant to the effect that the fact the 
city "may have adopted a standard of conduct with regard 
to ddects ill sidcwaU:s which shnhld be repa:r<>d, is not to be 
taken as evidence by you that said defects necessarily consti-
) 
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tuft' f131l~4'I'Cl"" awl d .. fp4'!ivf' ""IHlitioll<' ",!ti,'" \\'(\11'" I''''""", 
the City liahll' in dantagf's in \'\'1',,1. or aeciilf'lIh o""III'I'ill~ ;tl 
the location of such defects. " 'l'he instruction ell'arly indicates 
defendant's assumption that while the facts of the existence 
of the rule were true, yet it docs not necessarily show a dangl)r-
ous condition. That is undoubtedly the law, and it shows that 
the only thing with which defendant was concerned war; the 
admissibility of such a rule in evidence. It had been held 
admissible over its objection and it desired to have the true 
character of its value as evidence explained to the jury. 
The objections to the stiPlllation both at the time it was 
stated by the court out of the presence of the jury and whf'n 
it was read to them by the reporter, went only to the admis-
sibility of the rule, not the fact of its existence. At first defend-
ant's counsel stated that he objected "to the introduction of 
any evidence on the ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant 
and immaterial and doesn't tend to show whether or not this 
was a dangerous or defective condition; is merely a standard 
set np to prevent further deterioration of the street and was 
not t~ be taken as an indication in any manner that we believed 
it to be a dangerous or defective condition, but was merely a 
precautionary measure that has nothing to do under the law 
to set up any standard other than is defined in the law itself. 
It does not prove or disprove any of the issues involved in 
this case." All of the foregoing argument goes solely to the 
issue of whether the rule was for the purpose of preventing 
a deterioration of the streets or for the safety of pedestrians. 
That was a pure le[]al question relating to its admissibility. 
On its face the rule does not purport to be limited to preser,;'~' 
vation of the streets. It was broad enough to embrace both 
purposes. If counsel believed that the rule was so limited it 
was incumbent on him to establish that claim. All the objec-
tions of coun.'lel to the stipulation are along the same line. 
None of them questions the existence of the rule. 'l'hey are 
Solely concerned with its purpose and on that basis alone the 
claim of inadmissibility is made. Certainly it is manifest that 
the trial court and opposing counsel understood defendant'8 
objection as being no more comprehensive than that the (!vi-
dence was not admissible. If plaintiff's counsel had nnt been 
80 misled he could have called Kincaid and had him testify. 
On the issue of the admissibility of the rule, the majority 
k opinion has nothing to say. It was undoubtedly admissible 
f, and I am satisfied with the following dis~ussion and authori-
t,ties presented on that subject in the doomon by the Distri •• 
) 
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Court of Appeal in this case (83 A.C.A. li82 at lIP. 590-592 
[189 P.2d 62~ ): "Evidence may be given upon a trial of the 
act, declaration or omission of a party. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1870, subd. 2.) Any fact is admissible in evidence from 
which the facts in issue are logically inferable. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1870, subd. 15.) It is an elemental rule of evidence 
that the statements or conduct of a party tending to refute 
his position are admissible. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Texas P. B. 
Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468 [23 S.Ct. 622. 47 L.Ed. 905J. 
said that: 'What usually is done may be evidence of what 
ought to be done. but what ought to be done is fixed by a 
standard of reasonable prudence, whether it is usually com-
plied with or not.' Mr. Wigmore says that, 'the regulations 
adopted by an employer for the conduct of a factory or a 
transportation system, may be some evidence of his belief as 
to· the standard of care required, and thus of the negligent 
nature of an act violating those rules.' (2 Wigmore on Evi-
dence (3d ed.) § 282, p. 132.) Shearman and Redfield say that, 
'It has been said that" a violation of rules previously adopted 
by a defendant in reference to the safety of third persons has 
generally been admitted in evidence as tending to show negli-
gence of the defendant's disobedient servant for which the 
defendant is liable," , citing King v. Interborough B. T. Co., 
233 N.Y. 330, 333 [135 N.E. 519]. (3 Shearman and Redfield 
on Negligence, § 506, p. 1281.) 
"Evidence of a custom of a defendant and its violation is 
held admissible as some evidence of negligence. Scott v. Gallot, 
59 Cal.App.2d 421 [138 P.2d 685], was an action arising out 
of alleged negligence of the defendant. It was held that a 
motion for a new trial was properly granted because the court 
had erroneously stricken evidence introduced by the plaintiff 
of a custom of the defendant which it had violated. (See, 
also, Thomas v. Southern Pacific Co., 116 Cal.App. 126, 131 
[2 P.2d 544] ; Mace v. Watanabe, 31 Cal.App.2d 321, 323 [87 
P.2d 893]; Burke v. John E. Marshall, Inc., 42 Cal.App.2d 
195, 203 [108 P.2d 738].) 
•• An ordinance of a municipality prescribing rules and 
regulations for the conduct of its employees is admissible in 
evidence as an act or declaration of a party concerning a mat-
ter involved in the suit. (Jordan v. City of Lexington, 133 
Miss. 440 [97 So. 758] ; Hebenheimer v. City of St. Louis, 269 
Mo. 92 [189 S.W. 1180] ; McLeod v. City of Spokane, 26 Wash. 
346 [67 P. 74] ; City of Indianapolis v. Gaston, 58 Ind. 224; 
Smith v. City oj Pella, 86 Iowa 236 [53 N.W. 226].) 
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"We are dealing here with rules and regulations of the 
party itself. They are admissible, as they are virtually admis-
sions, in the language of the trial judge, • as to what was 
reasonably necessary for the safe maintenance of the street.' 
(2 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) § 462, p. 501.) 
"Appellant engages in an extended argument and citation 
of cases from other jurisdictions to the effect that rules and 
regulations of a railroad company for the conduct of its ser-
vants in the operation of its trains should not be admitted in 
evidence in this state. It says that even if such rules should 
be held admissible the principle should not be extended to rules 
and regulations of a municipal corporation for the conduct of 
its servant in the maintenance of its streets. Counsel appar-
ently overlooked the recent case of Simon v. Oity and Oounty 
of San Francisco, 79 Cal.App.2d 590 [180 P.2d 393], where 
the comt stated (pp. 597, 598); 'Defendants argue that the 
rules of a carrier are not admissible and may not be consid-
ered on the issue of a carrier's negligence where the injured 
party has no knowledge of the rules and did not rely upon 
them. That was undoubtedly the rule announced in Smellie v. 
Southern Pac. 00., 128 Cal.App. 567 [18 P.2d 97], by the 
District Court of Appeal, but, the Supreme Court, in denying 
a hearing in that case added the following comment (p. 583) : 
"Such denial, however, shall not be construed as an approval 
by this court of that portion of the opinion of the District 
Court of Appeal which holds that admission of evidence of 
the rules adopted by the defendant for the government of its 
business was incompetent and prejudicial." In thus qualify-
ing the appellate court opinion the Supreme Court undoubted-
ly had in mind its earlier decision in Geft v. Pacific Gas & Elec. 
00., 192 Cal. 621 [221 P. 376J. In that case, the court, after 
referring to the action of the motorman of defendant's street· 
car in suddenly stopping his car in such manner as to blockade 
a cross-street stated (p. 625): " ... his act in so doing was in 
violation of an operating rule of the defendant, forbidding its 
employees to stop the cars so as to block cross-streets or cross-
walks. The existence of this rule, of course, did not render its 
violation by defendant's employees negligence per se, but it 
. was a circumstance proper to be considered by the jury in 
~ J determining whether or not they were negligent." 
, .' "'In the more recent case of Nelson v. Southern Pacific 00., 
~" 8 Ca1.2d 648 [67 P .2d 682], the Supreme Court negatively 
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respondent's time table was erroneous. While the rules of 
operation are admissible (Oett v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co .• 192 
Cal. 621 [221 P. 376], ... ), we fail to see the materiality of 
the time table to the situation under scrutiny.". It follows 
that the rules were admissible and that it was a question of 
fact for the jury and not a question of law for the court to 
determine whether the conduct of the motorman, under the 
circumstances, constituted negligence. ' (See 3 Shearman and 
Redfield on Negligence, § 481, p. 1202) ; Chicago & A. By. Co. 
v. Eaton, 194 Ill. 441 [62 N.E. 784, 88 Am.St.Rep. 161] ; Ste-
vens v. Boston Elevated By. Co., 184 Mass. 476 [69 N.E. 338] ; 
Bilodeau v. F'itchberg &- L. St. By. Co., 236 Mass. 526 [128 
N.E. 872]; McNeil v. New York, N. H. & H. B. Co., 282 Mass. 
575 [185 N.E. 471].)" 
Finally, even assuming it was error to admit the stipula-
tion it was not prejudicial. The jury was fully instructed 
upon the correct standard with reference to defects in streets. 
For illustration it was advised: "A dangerous or defective 
condition, as denoted by the use of that term in these instruc-
tions means a condition in the sidewalk in question that would 
have caused it to be not reasonably safe for persons who, with 
ordinary care for their own safety, used said sidewalk, or 
might have used it for the purpose intended, or as expressly or 
impliedly invited, or as permitted by the controlling authority. 
"A mtmicipality is not bound to maintain its sidewalks in 
a condition to preclude the possibility of accident. It i,s not 
an insurer of the safety of the users of public sidewalks. The 
duty imposed by law upon the City is to exercise ordinary care 
to maintain its public sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition 
for their use in a proper manne~. The City has the same right 
as all individual to assume that in using the sidewalk the public 
will use ordinary care and caution. 
"A duty is imposed upon officers of a municipality, whose 
business requires them to inspect and repair sidewalks to exer-
cise due care to discover defects which may be reasonably antic-
ipated." It was given the general standard and it is not to be 
supposed that it adopted the "¥.& inch hole" rule referred to 
in the stipUlation. 
As before stated, the record discloses that no objection was 
made by counsel for defendant to the facts stated in the stip-
ulation. At no time did he state that he had not agreed or did 
not agree to stipulate to all of the facts contained in the stip-
ulation as dictated by the trial judge to the reporter and read 
by the reporter to the jury. A reading of the objections and 
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lIO tlollht hili I hat l~olll1s .. l·s ,,"1~' "hj<"'1 ill" 10 t I,,· .;t.ipulation 
was that it did not constitute competent evidence of defend-
ant's negligence because the instructions, rules or practice of 
the city with regard to the repair of defects in streets of over 
one-half inch in depth was not competent evidence that a hole 
of that depth (''!'eated a dangerous and defective condition 
which would render the city liable to anyone injured thereby. 
Counsel's position is made unquestionably clear in the follow-
ing statements made at the time the stipulation was introduced 
in evidence: "Ma. HAYES: W eU, I had better restate my 
position at this time. First, that the contents of the proposed 
stipulation with reference to the repairs of the damages as to I· sidewalks, are merely instructions to workmen, giving them some idea as to what types of holes, what to look for to indi-. cate if sidewalks are beginning to deteriorate. They are not 
~. a set of rules or standards. Second, that the superintendent 
of streets has no authority to adopt a set of rules which would 
give, as a standard for any imposition or determination of 
the liability of the City, what holes mayor may not be danger-
ous or defective. Third, that the City of Long Beach has the 
right to give instructions to its men to take preventive measures 
for the repair of its sidewalks which may be, or at a later datl~ 
~ become, defective without determining that the hole consti-
tutes dangerous or defective conditions or that there is any-
thing about the hole at the time that the repair is made that 
it is a dangerous or defective condition. . 
"May I mix argument with objections' On the further 
ground it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and does 
.. not tend to prove any of the issues in this case. It doesn't 
tend to prove this particular spot or any other particular spot 
0; in the City of Long Beach was in a dangerous or defective 
condition, calls for a conclusion on the part of Mr. Kincaid or 
the parties who make the repairs. That states my position as 
well as the objections." In view of the foregoing there is 
clearly no justification for the st.atements in the majority 
opinion to the effect that counsel for defendant did not agree 
to the facts stated in the stipulation and that the burden was 
on the plaintiff to prove counsel's assent to such facts before 
the stipulation was introduced in. evidence. Of course, it is 
obvious that there could be no stipulation of facts unless coun-
sel for both sides assented thereto, and the discussion in. the 
majority opinion in regard to the stipulation is talk .about 
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IIfllll('thill~ whi('h did not. fOxist if the gfnt.·rnl.'nts iu flll' majority 
opinion art' I~orre(!t. 
It was cert;tinly incumbent upon counsf!l for the defendant 
to in some manncr make known to the 1'0u~ and counsel for 
plaintiff that he did llot agree to the truth of the facts stated 
by the COllrt in the stipulation if any of t.hose facts were not 
in accord with the truth, or at least in accord with what Kin-
('aid would have testified to had be been called as a wit.nl'ss. 
I repeat again that at no time· did (!ollnsel for defendant assert 
that any of the facts contained in the stipulation ,vere untrne 
or that be did not agree to stipulate that if Kincaid wer'} 
called as a witness he would testify to all of Mid facts. 
In view of the situation as above narrated, there can bc no 
question but tliat the stipUlation as read by the trial judge 
to the reporter and reread by the reporter to the jury was 
agreed to by counsel for defendant, and in view of the rules 
of law which I have heretofore stated herein, thl're can be no 
question but that the IItipulation wes aomi'lSible in evidencfll. 
Since the only ground stated in the· majority opinion for 
the reversal of the judgment is that the court committed error 
in submitting to the jury a stipnlation containing facts which 
were not agreed to by counsel for defendant, and since this 
ground finds DO legal or factual basis in the record before us, 
the conclusion reached in the majority opinion is unsound. 
It must necessarily follow that the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Decem-
her 23, 1948. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a re-
. hearing~ 
